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Philip Kitcher argued that the freedom to pursue one’s version of the good life is
the main aim of Mill’s argument for freedom of expression. According to Kitcher,
in certain scientic elds, political and epistemological asymmetries bias research
toward conclusions that threaten this most important freedom of underprivileged
groups. Accordingly, Kitcher claimed that there are Millian grounds for limiting
freedom of inquiry in these elds to protect the freedom of the underprivileged.
I explore Kitcher’s argument in light of the interpretation Helen Longino gave to
Mill’s argument. She argued that free critical dialogue in the community allows
bias to be overcome, through intersubjective criticism of hypotheses and the back-
ground assumptions that frame them. I suggest that Longino’s approach allows for
the identication of the fundamental problems of the research programs Kitcher
targeted, and for the rejection of their claims to knowledge. us it is possible to
address Kitcher’s problem without limiting freedom of speech.
Keywords: freedom of speech, Mill, Kitcher, Longino, social consequences of re-
search
1. Introduction
In this paper, I focus on Philip Kitcher’s argument concerning freedom of
scientic inquiry that Kitcher based on his interpretation of John Stuart
Mill’s argument for freedom of expression.1 e argument, rst presented
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1 Mill’s main book on knowledge and the scientic method is System of Logic (1843); the
argument for freedom of speech is presented in Mill’s classic political essay On Liberty
(1859). Besides Kitcher and Longino, there are other philosophers of science who have
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in a journal article (1997), was later integrated in Kitcher’s discussion of the
ideal of “well-organised science” (2001). Kitcher argued that there are cases
in which the restriction of freedom of expression can be justied in the spirit
of Mill’s defence of the ultimate value of individual freedom. Accordingly,
Kitcher proposed a Millian argument against unrestricted freedom of in-
quiry in the elds of research whose conclusions are likely to threaten this
fundamental freedom of certain individuals. is argument constitutes a
part of Kitcher’s attempt to develop a philosophy of science with greater em-
phasis on its social consequences, such as questions of fairness and democ-
racy. I explore Kitcher’s argument through the lens of another philosopher’s
work on Mill, suggesting that Helen Longino’s account that approaches free
critical dialogue as the foundation for the creation of knowledge (Longino
1990, 2002) could address the problems Kitcher targeted with his argument,
without restricting free speech.
In the next section of the paper, in order to provide the background for
Kitcher’s and Longino’s arguments, I briey describeMill’s argument regard-
ing freedomof expression, and some aspects of his conception of knowledge.
In the third section, I summarise Kitcher’sMillian argument that justies re-
strictions of freedom of inquiry in particular elds of research. e fourth
section introduces some existing criticisms of Kitcher’s argument and char-
acterises the place of my own argument in this context. In the h section, I
describe Longino’s interpretation of the role of the Millian ideal in justica-
tion of knowledge claims, and her account of objectivity. e sixth section
shows howLongino’s approach can be applied to the cases Kitcher described.
I argue that drawing on her account it is possible to address the issue of neg-
ative social consequences of particular problematic lines of research and to
avoid the problems in connection with the restrictions Kitcher proposed.
e seventh section addresses several criticisms that can be raised against
this application of Longino’s account.
2. Mill’s argument
Mill presented his argument regarding freedom of thought and speech in
the second chapter of On Liberty. When describing the benets of free dis-
cussion, and the negative consequences of suppressing alternative opinions,
Mill suggested the following:
1. If the popular opinion is false, the availability of alternatives and
free discussion of them helps to overcome falsity and discover the
truth.
been interested in this argument of Mill’s—two examples are Feyerabend (e.g., 1991 and
1999; see also Lloyd 1997) and Goldman (1999).
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2. If the popular opinion is true, the presence of contrary opinions and
the necessity to reply to them facilitates a deeper understanding of
the content and justications of the true opinion. Further, discus-
sion keeps perception of the truth vivid; without it, opinions tend
to become dogmatic.
3. Most opinions, even true ones, are not the whole truth—discussing
alternative opinions helps to discover missing aspects of the truth
and to make our understanding of it fuller.
ese arguments presuppose that human knowledge is fundamentally
fallible—there is no way to make certain that opinions currently believed
to be true are indeed the truth, and Mill passionately condemned pretences
to infallibility (see, for instance, Mill 1978, 16–17). At the same time, Mill’s
arguments reveal his optimism about the human ability to improve existing
knowledge by means of free discussion. People are able to correct their mis-
takes, and free discussion is an adequate method for doing so and gradually
approaching the truth.
[T]he source of everything respectable inman either as an intellectual
or as amoral being, [is] namely, that his errors are corrigible. He is ca-
pable of rectifying his mistakes by discussion and experience. Not by
experience alone.ere must be discussion to show how experience
is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to
fact and argument; but facts and arguments, to produce any eect on
the mind, must be brought before it. [. . . ] [T]he only way in which
a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a
subject is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every va-
riety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at
by every character of mind. (Mill 1978, 19)
A conception of knowledge that can be reconstructed on the basis of these
arguments seems to be “proto-Popperian” (Ryan 1998, 509), as it stresses the
need to expose knowledge claims to possible refutations.2
3. Kitcher on freedom of speech and fairness for the underprivi-
leged
In his Millian argument, Kitcher focused on cases in which an appeal to
Mill’s argument is made to protect certain areas of controversial research
with far-reaching social consequences, such as research into the biological
2 Ryan noted that regardless of that, Mill’s argument was not primarily aimed at scientic
ideas. Longino (2002, 3–4), on the contrary, argued that original Mill’s argument was
meant to include science; she named Mill among the predecessors of her own philosophy
of science.
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basis of sex and race dierences, for instance, human sociobiology. ose
who appeal to Mill’s argument in such cases seem to presuppose that it sup-
ports unrestricted freedom of expression as the ultimate good. Kitcher ad-
mitted that his earlier arguments also did not question the value of freedom
of expression (Kitcher 1997, 280). In this paper I focus on another interpre-
tation of Mill’s argument Kitcher has since suggested.
In this new interpretation, Kitcher sees the freedom of the individuals to
freely pursue the mode of life they have freely chosen as the ultimate good
that Mill’s argument defends: “e only freedom which deserves the name
is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not at-
tempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their eorts to obtain it” (Mill
1978, 12). Kitcher (2001, 95) used this quote to sum up the aim ofMill’s argu-
ment and stressed thatMill defended freedomof speech as necessary for this
general aim. Kitcher argued that in certain cases and for certain individuals,
unlimited freedom of inquiry can jeopardise the fundamental freedom to
pursue one’s version of good life. Accordingly, in such cases certain restric-
tions on freedom of inquiry are justied.is is the central idea of Kitcher’s
argument.
Kitcher identied several conditions that make his argument applicable
(Kitcher 2001, 96–98). e rst condition is related to the social context of
research. Research takes place in society in which there are considerable
inequalities and members of certain underprivileged groups have a lower
quality of life, and less chance at achieving good life. Inequalities are par-
tially caused by residual beliefs about the natural inferiority of members of
these groups—such beliefs are mostly repudiated but still retain some inu-
ence. If research provides conclusions that reinforce such beliefs, it is likely
to endanger the chances of the underprivileged to pursue their life projects
by diminishing their sense of self-worth and worsening their social climate.
Research conclusions are likely to be interpreted as supporting the ine-
galitarian beliefs if two further conditions apply, which Kitcher called “po-
litical and epistemic asymmetries”.
Political asymmetry describes the situation in which:
1. When research supports hypotheses that members of underprivi-
leged groups are less suited to socially privileged positions, old be-
liefs are revived. Refutation of such hypotheses does not lead to
considerable eradication of residual old beliefs.
2. Society-wide acceptance of such inegalitarian conclusions leads to a
further reduction in quality of life for the underprivileged. Quality
of life for underprivileged groups does not improve unless there is
a considerable eradication of residual beliefs.
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Epistemic asymmetry occurs when inegalitarian conclusions are perceived
as better justied than can be warranted while refutations of inegalitarian
conclusions are perceived as less justiable than can be warranted. us,
even when evidence is indecisive, epistemic asymmetry produces unjusti-
ed support from researchers and the public for inegalitarian conclusions.
Inegalitarian conclusions have an unfair advantage when competing with
alternative views. Because Mill’s ideal presupposes that ideas compete with
each other on equal terms, Kitcher argued that, in practice, theMillian arena
falls short of the ideal (Kitcher 1997, 291).
In order to apply Kitcher’s argument to particular kinds of research, it
is necessary to demonstrate that the research programs in question gener-
ates ideas that are relevant to socially entrenched beliefs concerning under-
privileged groups, that their interpretations are shaped by asymmetries, and
that their conclusions are likely to be seen as supporting inegalitarian be-
liefs. According to Kitcher (2001, 98–100), for instance, some debates in hu-
man sociobiology and human behavioural genetics satisfy these conditions.
Overall, such research negatively aects the chances of underprivileged to
live a good life of their own choosing. erefore, Kitcher argued, there are
grounds for restricting freedom of inquiry in these areas in order to protect
the fundamental freedom of the underprivileged.
Kitcher (2002, 105–108) discussed the issue of implementing restrictions
on freedomof inquiry, and concluded that a direct banwould be counterpro-
ductive. Among other eects, political and epistemic asymmetries prevent
public recognition of unfair bias toward inegalitarian conclusions. Accord-
ingly, a ban on certain lines of research is likely to be perceived as an attempt
to silence legitimate research for political motives, which, in turn, could re-
inforce existing prejudices. One possible solution is for scientists to treat
the conclusion of Kitcher’s argument as a moral imperative, wherein they
would have a duty to refrain from certain inquiries. However, Kitcher noted
that this is an unrealistic solution, since the current social climate and po-
litical/epistemological asymmetries create incentives for scientists to pursue
research projects that resonate with residual inegalitarian beliefs and gen-
erate considerable public interest. Kitcher stressed the need to analyse the
functioning of the Millian arena in dierent areas of inquiry, in order to
identify its failures and possibilities for improvement. In some elds of re-
search, where the potentially negative social consequences are great and bi-
ases inescapable, according to Kitcher, there is just cause not to pursue some
lines of inquiry.
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4. Some existing criticisms concerning Kitcher’s argument
Kitcher’s approach to the regulation of research has provoked several re-
sponses. Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin (2007) argued that restricting free-
dom of inquiry in particular research areas would have negative conse-
quences in terms of both social fairness and the progress of science. If con-
scientious researchers accept Kitcher’s argument, and abstain from research
into race and sex dierences, these areas may be abandoned to those who
do not acknowledge Kitcher’s argument. Among them are likely to be those
whodonot believe that current inequalities are unfair but rather justify them
on the basis of their own beliefs about innate inferiority of members of un-
derprivileged groups.eir research is overwhelmingly likely to deliver con-
clusions that inuence the social climate for the underprivileged negatively.
In other words, the restrictions might actually worsen the situation for the
underprivileged.3 A duty to abstain from particular research topics, given
the global character of science and the unpredictability of research develop-
ments and connections, could paralyse scientists’ ability to plan and carry
out any long-term research.ough I believe that Talisse and Aikin made a
valid point, they did not propose a solution to Kitcher’s concern about the
negative social value of certain research programs.
James Brown suggested that while he does not see a problem in ban-
ning certain lines of research, a more promising strategy would be to ensure
that scientic community is “suitably diverse” (Brown 2004, 605). According
to Brown’s argument, if underprivileged groups are adequately represented
among scientists, biased research will be criticised internally, and the over-
all quality of research will improve without the need to restrain any lines of
inquiry. K. BradWray (2001) also suggested that mutual criticism in diverse
epistemic communities would prevent individual or group biases from de-
termining the results of scientic research. (Unlike Kitcher, Wray argued
that biases characterise all areas of research, not just certain problematic
ones.)
My own argument, based on the work of Helen Longino, also focuses on
diversity as a crucial factor for addressing bias in socially consequential re-
search. Employing Longino’s social epistemology, I attempt to develop this
line of argumentation further in two respects. Firstly, her account of scien-
tic objectivity, based on critical interactions in diverse communities, can be
applied to research programs in order to analyse the nature of their problems
and to evaluate their claims to knowledge. Secondly, Longino saw the social
3 Kitcher (2007) argued that negative consequences would not be as widespread and drastic:
in some cases the abandoned research would not be undertaken by anyone else and so no
negative consequences would follow; in other cases the backlash would be counteracted
by conscientious researchers criticising the fallacies of biased research.
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organisation of communities as directly relevant to eectively preventing bi-
ases. I suggest that in order to address the problems that Kitcher identied
scientic research should be structured in such a way thatmaximises critical
dialogue in scientic community.
5. Longino on background assumptions and transformative crit-
icism
I suggest, based on Kitcher’s descriptions of problematic research areas and
their social consequences, that they can be seen as depending on certain
general assumptions, including:
1. Members of underprivileged groups all share certain biological
traits; these traits aremore important than those they share with the
rest of the population or the variability between the groupmembers.
2. Abilities and social achievements can be directly linked to one’s bi-
ological makeup.
3. Given a certain makeup, only limited development of the abilities
in question is possible.
4. Scientic ndings in these areas can, and should, be translated into
social policy.
ese assumptions do not constitute a list of the necessary and sucient
conditions that identify problematic programs. Rather, they provide a gen-
eral framework that makes such programs possible. In other words, they
create the context in which these approaches and interpretationsmake sense.
None of the assumptions is self-evidently true; however, they sometimes es-
cape critical scrutiny if discussion focuses on particular hypotheses rather
than the assumptions that provide a framework for them.
Longino called such enabling assumptions ‘background assumptions’
(Longino 1990, 43). ey form the background for linking data and hy-
potheses, thus solving the problem of underdetermination (the logical gap
between data and hypotheses). Hypotheses can only be justied as sup-
ported by some data in context of background assumptions that establish
the relevance of the data for hypotheses. But this account of justication on
the basis of background assumptions creates the problem of justifying the
assumptions themselves. How is it possible to prevent the inuence of sci-
entists’ subjective biases on their background assumptions? is problem
is particularly acute because background assumptions are typically invisible
for those who hold them. Longino turned to Mill to address this issue.
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Longino claimed that she shares with Mill the belief about “the neces-
sity of critical interaction for the integrity of knowledge” (Longino 2002, 4).
According to Longino (1990, 64–76), science is a collective activity that nec-
essarily requires interaction between practitioners. It is only through critical
interactions between community members that a certain degree of objectiv-
ity is possible. In order to be accepted as communal knowledge, hypotheses
have to survive criticism from multiple points of view. In this process, the
biases and idiosyncrasies of individual scientists can be checked and elimi-
nated.
Relevant criticism of a hypothesis can be suggested by communitymem-
bers on several levels. While evidential criticism focuses on experimental
and observational concerns, conceptual criticism deals with theoretical and
meta-theoretical issues, including the relevance of certain data for particular
hypotheses. It is the latter form of criticism that targets background assump-
tions and thus plays a crucial role in preventing the inuence of subjective
biases. It is important to stress that explication of the background assump-
tions does not by itself prove the research is awed4—all research is shaped
by some assumptions. It is those assumptions that are le unchecked by
communal criticism that pose a problem. When exposed, problematic as-
sumptions have to be defended, modied or abandoned—Longino (1990,
73) called this kind of criticism ‘transformative’. Diversity of points of view
and freedom of discussion are crucial for eective criticism. e availabil-
ity of alternative hypotheses and approaches can reveal the dependence of
particular hypotheses on certain background assumptions and thus provide
opportunity for their critical discussion.
Scientic objectivity in this approach requires the kind of debate Mill
envisaged in his work. Free debate ensures that opinions that are deemed
communally unacceptable are eliminated and (tentatively) accepted ones
are developed further through critical discussion. However, the eciency
of such a discussion may be hindered if there are limited venues for the pre-
sentation of criticism, or if the community is not particularly responsive to
it. Longino (1990, 76–81) suggested a set of criteria for transformative criti-
cism as the basis for judging a community’s ability to support production of
objective knowledge:
1. the availability of recognised public venues for criticism;
2. shared standards for judging the relevance of both criticisms and
reactions to them (these standards are not xed but are also open
for communal criticism and may be modied);
4 Kitcher (1997, 298) seemed to presuppose that.
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3. the community’s response to criticism (uptake);
4. and the equality of intellectual authority among the participants.
Longino (2002, 129) noted that although the criteria may seem trivial, it is
important to acknowledge the extent to which social organisation of science
can discourage criticism. For instance, in research communities, the pres-
sure to produce positive results, and issues such as secrecy and the privati-
sation of results, are factors that can prevent criticism from being presented
widely and taken seriously. In order to support ecient criticism, attention
to the social organisation of science is therefore as important as attention
to diversity (or lack thereof) and the representation of dierent groups in
scientic community.
Longino’s criteria oer a framework for assessing how closely a research
community approaches the Millian ideal. Her contextual account of justi-
cation explains in turn why this ideal has crucial epistemic importance.
What can this approach say about the research areas Kitcher criticised?
6. A Longinian solution
According to Longino (2002, 134), a community qualies as knowledge-
producing only to the degree it satises the criteria for transformative criti-
cism. If there is no ecient criticism and no response to it, the community
does not qualify as knowledge-productive and the outcomes of its practices
do not qualify as knowledge (see, e.g., Longino 2002, 135–136 for the deni-
tion of epistemic acceptability and 156–162 for examples of its application to
criticise certain claims to knowledge).
Kitcher characterised a considerable part of the past and present work
in human sociobiology and behavioural genetics as showing precisely this
kind of blindness to relevant empirical and conceptual criticism, and obdu-
racy in following the same programs with the same assumptions as if un-
challenged (Kitcher 1985 is entirely dedicated to criticism of several inu-
ential sociobiological programs; see also Kitcher 2001, 99–100). When fail-
ures of such programs to include relevant critical perspectives and to react
to criticism of their claims, methods and background assumptions are ex-
posed, their claims to valid scientic knowledge (and to well-founded bases
for social policy) can be refuted as not satisfying Longino’s requirements for
a knowledge-productive community.us, one is justied in refusing to ac-
cept their claims as knowledge.
It is important to stress that Longino’s account does not require to re-
strict research programs by decision of an external ocial body. Longino’s
norms operate on the community level, wherein members of a knowledge-
producing community assess each other. Her criteria help to judge how se-
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riously knowledge claims and research programs that produce them should
be taken. ey stress the responsibility connected with participation in a
Millian exchange of ideas.5 Failure to carry this responsibility—to adhere to
the norms of criticism—results in the diminished credibility of claims in a
community-wide discussion.
It is equally important to stress that Longino’s criteria do not presuppose
that a judgement requires some independent “objective” position. Making
judgements of this kind is a part of interactive process of dialogue-based
knowledge production: members of the community and members of other
communities assess hypotheses and research programswhen they drawupon
them in their own work, or when they criticise them as a part of their work,
or when they intentionally challenge particular research programs (like
Longino 1990 did in her case studies). ese judgements may in turn be
challenged as a part of continuing debate.ere is no absolute, immovable
basis for objectivity in Longino’s account and judgements about a commu-
nity’s objectivity are not absolute either. Her criteria describe the ideal con-
ditions for objectivity; in practice, satisfaction of these criteria is a matter
of degree. e more evident the failure of a particular research program to
adhere to these norms, as assessed bymembers of relevant communities, the
less credibility the research should be assigned.
Besides providing the criteria for exposing failures of objectivity in prob-
lematic research programs, Longino’s account also opens additional possi-
bilities for criticising these programs. Alongside evidential andmethodolog-
ical criticisms of a research program, it is possible to criticise the conceptual
and metaphysical assumptions that shape it. is kind of criticism is more
ecient if there exists a variety of alternative approaches. Longino provided
several examples that show how alternative research programs help to make
background assumptions visible. One such example is taken from research
on sex dierences: Longino (1990, 133–162) compared the behavioural neu-
roendocrinological programand the selectionist theory of higher brain func-
tion. Behavioural neuroendocrinology relies on assumptions about the du-
ality of male-female brains and behavioural traits, and the direct link be-
tween prenatal exposure to sex hormones and these sex dierences.e se-
lectionist theory relies on assumptions about the continuum of variations
in individual behaviour and about the plasticity of the brain that is par-
tially shaped by individual intentional behaviour. In the presence of an al-
ternative, the background assumptions of behavioural neuroendocrinology,
5 In her presentation of contextualism, Kristina Rolin (2008, 119–120) discussed Longino’s
ideas in parallel with Michael Williams’s account of “default and challenge model”.
Longino’s norms can also be seen as stressing the duty to defend or to modify one’s be-
liefs if appropriately challenged.
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which have the potential for inegalitarian conclusions, can no longer be pre-
sented as self-evidently true.
e development of alternative research programs on the basis of as-
sumptions that do not easily lend support to inegalitarian conclusions can
thus expose problematic research programs in sociobiology and behavioural
genetics. It may also help to change the assumptions that shape a eld of re-
search, leading to a new consensus aboutwhat constitutes proper approaches,
relevant evidence and well-founded hypotheses. Kitcher (2002, 557) himself
gave an example of such a change, in an area in which assumptions about sex
and gender play a major role. During the time primatologists were mostly
men, the dominant approach in primate studies focused one-sidedly on ag-
gressiveness between male primates. When women began to enter the eld,
they focused on a wider range of behaviours. Kitcher explained this change
in scientic practice as a result of the fact that for female scientists, dierent
events were salient, enabling them to propose new hypotheses. I suggest that
this development can be seen as a positive example that research based on
alternative assumptions (an alternative vision of the eld thatmakes particu-
lar events salient) may have some inuence in a research area that is aected
by sex and gender stereotypes and can reinforce them.
As described above, the Longinian solution to the problems of particular
research programs depends on two conditions. One of them is diversity of
community. In many cases, making problematic background assumptions
visible is only possible in the presence of hypotheses based on alternative
assumptions. Development of alternatives requires, in turn, that a variety of
perspectives and ways of framing issues be represented in community. Un-
derrepresentation of women and minorities in science and undervaluation
of non-Western science constitute an epistemic problem because it reduces
diversity in scientic community (Longino 2002, 132). is problem can
only be remedied by inclusion of these mostly excluded groups.
e second condition requires adherence to certain criteria that encour-
age criticismand support its integration into a community’s claims andback-
ground frameworks. If the social structure and practices of a particular sci-
entic community discourage criticism and responsiveness to it, and if di-
versity of members is not appreciated as a cognitive resource but rather sup-
pressed by the conditions of scientic education and career, increasing in-
clusiveness in sciencemay not be sucient. As Longino (2002, 132) stressed,
[e community] must do more than be open to the expression of
multiple points of view; it must also take active steps to ensure that
alternative points of view are developed enough to be a source of crit-
icism and new perspectives.
So, in addition to taking action to ensure the adequate representation of un-
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derrepresented groups, as Brown proposed, it is equally important that the
community creates conditions that can support cultivation of diverse per-
spectives and ecient transformative criticism. Longino’s interest in devel-
oping normative criteria for communal dialogue recognises the point, which
Kitcher also made, that in practice, what is called the Millian arena does not
always function properly, and it is important to analyse what its proper func-
tioning requires.
A solution based on Longino’s approach would avoid some of the prob-
lems connected with Kitcher’s argument, such as the tension between recog-
nising a problem and implementing change without the threat of backlash.
In Longino’s account there is no such gap. e same set of criteria based
on Longino’s account of objectivity can be helpful for exposing problem-
atic research programs and for addressing their problems. Furthermore,
the approach based on Longino’s account would avoid the problems Talisse
and Aikin described in connection with the restrictions Kitcher proposed—
the threat of proliferation of inequality-justifying research in the absence
of counteracting research and the possible dampening eect on long-term
planning of research. As there are no such restrictions in Longino’s ap-
proach, it would not interfere with long-term planning in science and it
actively encourages the development of alternative research programs that
could counteract existing problematic ones. At the same time, Longino’s ap-
proach addresses the question of the social consequences of research, which
is omitted in Talisse and Aikin’s defence of freedom of inquiry. In Longino’s
account, checks on the scientic and social consequences of research are
provided through ongoing critical analysis of assumptions, including values
and aims that frame research programs. So it is possible to recognise, and to
tackle, the questions of social fairness that motivated Kitcher’s argument.
However, there may be raised the question whether Longino’s account
of objectivity is sucient to address the issues. In the following section I
focus on several criticisms that have been presented in other discussions
of Longino’s work and are also relevant for the application of Longino’s ap-
proach that I have been developing. I attempt to show that these arguments
do not threaten the application of Longino’s theory as a helpful approach to
the problems with which Kitcher’s argument is concerned.
7. Some criticisms and replies
7.1 Long-term perspective
Kitcher (1997, 296–297) stressed thatMill’s argument takes a long-term view:
“Mill recognises that the public presentation and discussion of false doc-
trines may detract from human welfare, but he supposes that this will be
a short-term eect, and encourages us to take a longer view”. Kitcher was
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concerned that unrestricted discussion and research might harm individu-
als and groups in the here and now.
e question of whether and to what degree a long-term perspective
should be used, when considering knowledge production and its social con-
sequences, also arises in connection with Longino’s account. Her approach
suggests a vision of communities that should endlessly develop toward
greater objectivity, with her criteria as the regulatory ideal. It is possible
that at some point, a community could develop the degree of objectivity and
an ability to produce objective knowledge that enables ecient problem-
solving strategies. However, this is insucient if there is an immediate
present need to tackle particular problems. e conict between “long-
term” philosophical thinking and the need to engage philosophy of science
in urgent policy issues motivated Don Howard (2009) to argue for the re-
form of the current philosophy of science.
However, I suggest that Longino’s approach makes possible such an en-
gagement. If we recognise that background assumptions, including value-
laden ones, inevitably serve as the frame for any hypothesis, we open up the
possibility that hypotheses may be developed and presented in the frame-
work of intentionally chosen assumptions that reect particular commit-
ments and values, for instance, a commitment to equality and social fair-
ness. As Longino (1990, 191, emphasis added) wrote in her discussion of the
possibility of feminist science,
We cannot restrict ourselves simply to the elimination of bias [as the
value-free ideal of science would presuppose] but must expand our
scope to include the detection of limiting interpretive frameworks
and the nding or construction of more appropriate frameworks.
Accordingly, as a part of one’s work as a scientist one may choose to create,
or support, frameworks that are consistent with what one is committed to as,
for instance, a feminist. (At the same time, according to Longino, such oppo-
sitional science should retain connection with the norms of scientic com-
munity, as presence of some shared standards is necessary for an alternative
to be acknowledged in the community.) Like any others, hypotheses created
in the context of such intentionally chosen assumptions should be subject to
the relevant community’s critical scrutiny. Longino’s account of objectivity
describes the conditions that help to make such scrutiny result in creation
of intersubjectively acceptable knowledge.e same scrutiny should also be
applied to existing research programs, and the emergence of intentionally
dierent programs can in fact help to make political and ideological com-
mitments behind the existing programs more visible. As Longino discussed
these issues in connection with her own work on dierent conceptual mod-
els in research on sex dierences, her argument may serve as a ready model
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for engaging with the elds with which Kitcher’s argument is concerned, like
human sociobiology.
Kitcher (2001) himself recently described a similar model for the discus-
sion of the values that frame alternative hypotheses.is model constitutes
a part of the further elaboration of the ideal of well-ordered science Kitcher
has developed since introducing the concept in 2001. In Kitcher’s (2011, 61–
62) example a concerned climate scientist might present scenarios of cli-
mate change together with considerations that frame them. is scientist
might discuss the values that anticipated climate changes would endanger
and the concurrent duty to prevent human suering.e value framework
presented by the climate scientist can be contrasted with alternatives, such
as those values held by an industry partisan. Dierent value frameworks are
to be judged according to their public acceptability in the ideal conversa-
tion that satises the conditions of mutual engagement. Would a particular
framework be accepted in a conversation where all members of the human
species take part, in which participants engage sympathetically with others,
giving others’ desires equal weight to their own, and the ultimate goal is to
provide everyone with the best chance for a worthwhile life? Such an ap-
proach recognises the values that shape current research and argues for the
possibility of intentionally embedding values in research in order to address
urgent problems and advance communally acceptable values.
I thus suggest that Longino’s account provides resources for immediate
engagement with socially consequential research, and that some important
similarities can be shown in both Longino’s and recent Kitcher’s strategies
for such engagement.
7.2 Objectivity
Another potential problem in Longino’s approach is related to her account of
objectivity. As Sylvia Culp (1995, 440) summarised the problem, “even when
dependence on idiosyncratic presuppositions is eliminated, dependence on
the presuppositions shared by the entire community might not be”.
Longino (e.g., 2002, 135) herself acknowledged this issue. Assumptions
that are shared by all members of the community may remain invisible to
criticism, no matter how inclusive the community. Or community mem-
bers may not include potentially relevant perspectives because they are not
available to them in practice, e.g., they are spatially and temporarily remote.
Longino concluded that acceptance of knowledge claims and assumptions
is always tentative. No matter how thorough intersubjective criticism may
be, new criticism is always possible in principle. Longino’s social objectiv-
ity thus has certain intrinsic limitations. ey are not xed—it is not given
what assumptions may remain hidden from a community—but the possi-
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bility that some remain so is inescapable. I acknowledge this limitation of
Longino’s account.
However, I suggest that the limited character of objectivity does not en-
danger the application of her account that I have been describing. According
to Longino (e.g., 2002, 134), objectivity is a matter of degree. Her criteria de-
scribe an ideal that serves as the basis for evaluating particular research pro-
grams and identifying their failures. So in practice, instead of focusing on
the (im)possibility of absolute objectivity, one should focus on repairing par-
ticular failures of objectivity in particular communities. In many cases these
can be easily recognised. For instance, in science, it is a well-known issue
that women and other underprivileged groups are substantially underrepre-
sented. As Longino noted, their underrepresentation is a particularly acute
problem in case of research that is shaped by sexist and racist assumptions—
in the absence of voices from the underprivileged groups, these assumptions
remain unchallenged (Longino 1990, 78–79). Or, for instance, as Kitcher ar-
gued, the eld of sociobiology has failed to acknowledge, and to react to,
relevant and readily available criticism—the failure to adhere to the norm
of uptake is prominent there. Additionally, a detailed critical exploration of
particular programs may bring to light more subtle problems in connection
with particular assumptions employed there. (Longino stressed repeatedly
(e.g., 1990, 80–81 and 193–194) the importance of critical engagement that is
local and focuses on particular research programs to analyse their assump-
tions in-depth.) e community should then focus on repairing lapses in
objectivity that have been identied, improving objectivity in community
“by degrees”. In case of above examples, communities should take action to
include relevant perspectives that are missing, or expose research programs
that fail to support transformative criticism. As Longino’s account is com-
patible with political (e.g., feminist) activism and actually encourages it, her
account can be read as promoting in scientic community andwider society,
in addition to critical analysis, action to improve inclusiveness, to cultivate
formerly excluded perspectives and to improve responsiveness of scientic
communities.6
6 In her criticism of Longino’s account, Janet Kourany (2010) put into doubt eciency of
such measures: according to her, scientic community historically was, and mostly re-
mains, privileged and elitist. Even if the requirement of inclusiveness is heeded, the num-
ber of the underprivileged in science and their inuence are severely limited, as they are
selected and trained, and their working conditions and opportunities are shaped, by the
privileged groupwith its “privilegecentric and privilegist” (Kourany 2010, 60) biases. How-
ever, as Kourany herself pointed out, in some cases greater presence of previously under-
represented groups in science has indeed led to emergence of alternative research that has
inuenced, or in some successful cases, displaced, previous biased programs. I suggest that
although Longino’s account cannot guarantee a full or immediate success politically and
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is strategy can help to address scientic and social issues that cur-
rently arise in connection with sociobiology and similar elds. According
to the notion of objectivity by degrees, we can hope to improve objectivity
of scientic communities by rst addressing the lapses of objectivity that (at
least some) community members or members of other relevant communi-
ties recognise at the moment. It is possible that the reformed community
would still be characterised by some invisible assumptions and omissions to
include relevant perspectives. Nonetheless, it may be more objective com-
pared to the present state of the community andmight have eradicated some
of its present biases. Moreover, in this new state, lapses of objectivity that are
not recognised now can become visible and thus become the new target for
improving objectivity in a potentially endless development.
As Longino’s account encourages attention to the currently recognised
problems of objectivity and action to remedy them, I suggest that it could be
useful for addressing the issues of particular research programs (the subject
of Kitcher’s argument), despite the fundamental limitations of community-
based objectivity.
7.3 Sociality
e nal objection to Longino’s account that I address was articulated by
Justin Biddle (2009) and concerns the general nature of her account. Biddle
argued that there is a contradiction between Longino’s claim that objectivity
is fundamentally social and the conception of individual her account presup-
poses. According to Biddle, Longino’s norm of uptake is meant to operate
on the level of individuals—for a community to adhere to the norm of up-
take, most of its members should be responsive to criticism. Biddle argued
that in Longino’s account this responsiveness is in turn understood in the
spirit of Millian liberalism as being “open to everything” (Biddle 2009, 618).
Individuals are supposed to be capable of questioning any of their beliefs in
response to any criticism from any perspective. However, such individuals,
given their ultimate open-mindedness, are in principle capable of evaluating
and criticising all of their beliefs on their own, without the need for input
from other individuals.us, social interactions may be helpful but are not
fundamentally necessary for objectivity—Longino’s account is not truly so-
cial.
Contrary to Biddle’s claim, I suggest that Longino’s account does not rely
on each individual’s absolute openness to criticism. Longino (1990, 79) her-
self stated that in her account objectivity does not depend on particular atti-
epistemically, it can still be helpful for exposing failures of particular research programs,
like those that concerned Kitcher, and encouraging change.
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tudes of individuals, “e objectivity of individuals in this scheme consists in
their participation in the collective give-and-take of critical discussion and
not in some special relation (of detachment, hardheadedness) theymay bear
to their observations”.us, Longino did not treat one’s detached, “open” at-
titude towards one’s beliefs as necessary for community’s objectivity. Later,
Longino (2002, 147) characterised as inadequate the conception of a know-
ing subject as the “idealised Subject”, “capable of the view from nowhere,
the unconditioned (or universally conditioned) Subject”. She stressed that
her account presupposes knowing subjects that are embodied, socially lo-
cated, and culturally conditioned. Such individuals are not capable of abso-
lute openness Biddle described as the necessary basis of her account.
Instead, in her account the norm of responsiveness can be realised on
the level of community (in Biddle’ terms, it is social interpretation of up-
take) thanks to particular social organisation of knowledge production and
communication. Before an individual contribution is accepted as a part of
public knowledge, it must necessarily pass critical scrutiny by others. Peer-
review may be the most well known form of this scrutiny, but criticism also
continues aerwards. In addition to direct critical challenge, individuals’
claims may be modied by community in other ways—by attempts to repli-
cate the results by other means, to use them in new contexts, to develop
them further or to reconcile them with conicting claims. ese processes
maintain objectivity of publicly accepted knowledge in the sense of block-
ing individual idiosyncrasies from entering public knowledge unchecked.
e important feature of these processes is that they can operate eciently
on the communal level to a certain degree independently from individu-
als’ attitudes towards their beliefs. It is possible that individuals question
and modify their beliefs and assumptions aer encountering criticism from
others. It is also possible that their claims are taken up by others, modied
and brought in accordance with a community’s standards to become public
knowledge, even if the authors of the claims do not accept these community-
based criticisms and modications (see Longino 1990, 68–69 and 73–74, on
absorption of individuals’ claims into public knowledge). Some openness
to criticism on part of each individual is necessary—one cannot be a mem-
ber of a scientic community unless one is responsive to criticism enough
to adhere to the requirements of peer-review. Yet, for a community to be
objective, openness is not required to the absolute degree Biddle described.
One’s locatednessmay limit one’s ability to question deeply held assumptions
or recognise them as such (though it may be possible). However, the social
organisation of science makes it possible to use inevitably partial individual
contributions for the collective production of intersubjectively acceptable
knowledge. In this sense, Longino’s account represents the very method of
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social scientic practice that Biddle himself defended.
8. Conclusion
Kitcher suggested that certain areas of research are inuenced by political
and epistemic asymmetries and are likely to produce conclusions that could
have profoundly negative eects on underprivileged social groups. Accord-
ingly, such research programs should not be continued. I have attempted
to show that the issue of problematic research programs with far-reaching
negative social consequences can be addressed without limiting freedom of
speech. I have suggested that Longino’s account can be used as the basis for
addressing this issue. Longino developed an account of objective knowledge
as emerging in the process of thorough intersubjective criticism of hypothe-
ses and the background assumptions that frame them. Accordingly, if the
scientic communities that produce the kind of research in question do not
adhere to the criteria of inclusive and responsive criticism, and if their claims
have not undergone critical scrutiny of a properly diverse community, their
knowledge claims can be rejected as illegitimate. Simultaneously, Longino’s
account encourages the development of research programs based on alter-
native background assumptions committed to egalitarian values. Diverse
communities and the support of conditions that encourage ecient dialogic
criticism are the two crucial elements in the solution based on Longino’s
epistemological account.
In writing this paper, my aim has been to describe how Longino’s ac-
count can be applied to the particular scientico-political issues as Kitcher
framed them and to address several criticisms that can be raised against such
application. I hope to have shown that Longino’s account of objectivity is ro-
bust enough to support tackling of these issues, that it allows for immediate
engagement with them, and that accordingly, it can be helpful for addressing
the epistemic and political concerns that motivated Kitcher’s argument.
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